Root of Trust & Digital Bearer Asset Inheritance
Using social recovery as a personal, offline, geographically distributed root of trust.
Boaz Bechar · May 2026
A few words about me
Boaz Bechar
Father of two
Former SVP digital assets and cyber innovation
Previously: Citi, Bitmain, BTC.com, Blocktrail
The bus factor
What happens to your keys if something happens to you ?
Disaster Recovery for the self-custodian is still a wild west.
A detour into what lasts
It's hard to hold onto anything for decades .
Kept ~40 years, and still here.
You're in good company
Even the largest institutions back up keys on paper .
…move it to USB sticks and paper backups. We then take these to a safe deposit box.
Source: Coinbase blog, 2012
The Coinbase team goes to a secure location… and prints out keys that are then split up using… scannable QR codes . We… apply… Shamir's Secret Sharing … split it into a bunch of chunks… a threshold… sufficient to reconstruct the original. The binders full of billions of dollars worth of keys are then divided among various secure locations.
Source: CoinDesk, 2018
Photos: Coinbase blog, 2012
The gold standard
The internet's own root of trust is a ceremony .
ICANN's DNSSEC root key ceremony
Trusted officers, smartcards, safes, tamper-evident bags, filmed for the world to audit. IANA · Root KSK Ceremony 61
Institutions aside
So what do the rest of us do?
A hardware wallet is a signing device, not long-term storage, so the real backup falls to you.
The typical setup today
A seed on a card at home is cash under the mattress .
Seed phrase
1 ····· 7 ·····
2 ····· 8 ·····
3 ····· 9 ·····
4 ····· 10 ·····
5 ····· 11 ·····
6 ····· 12 ·····
Fire : one bad day, gone
Flood : ink and paper don't swim
Evil maid or houseguest : brief access is enough
Ballistic missile : if you're in the mideast
The usual approaches
What we try, and where it breaks .
Etched metal plate
Survives fire and flood, but still one copy in one place.
Split it
Two spots, now two single points of failure.
Onchain mechanics
On-chain timelocks or multisig: hostage to one protocol.
Buy the ETF
Give up self-custody.
I needed something chain-agnostic and disaster-resilient .
The other failure mode
Insider risk for the self-custodian .
Can you trust yourself?
They're family, not security experts
Self-custody is a privilege and a burden
The physical threat is real
The $5 wrench beats $5,000 of cryptography .
82 documented attacks in 2025: the worst year on record, roughly double the prior peak
331 documented since 2014, and most go unreported
Data: Jameson Lopp · github.com/jlopp/physical-bitcoin-attacks
The turn
What if the secret never lived in one place ?
No crown jewel .
A safe that's geographically distributed .
Disaster-resilient by design.
It's not a new idea
A safety net made of people you trust .
Apple · Account Recovery Contacts
Facebook · Trusted Contacts
It doesn't have to be social
1
2
3
4
5
6
Any 3 of 6 rebuilds it.
Split it. Spread it out .
Social recovery doesn't have to be social: hold every share yourself
Spread them across places: a safe abroad, a USB in a drawer, a shard online
Pick any threshold: 2-of-3 , 5-of-10 , 10-of-20
Each share is useless alone ; it only works combined
m-of-n threshold
So I built it
A foundational password vault
Store secrets and passwords on encrypted paper with distributed keys. Designed to last generations.
Open source
Run it yourself, offline
Secured with m-of-n keys
Social recovery
Digital inheritance
PaperVault · papervault.xyz · github.com/boazeb/papervault
A home for every secret
What goes in a paper vault ?
Your 2FA recovery codes
The disk-encryption key when you unbox a new laptop
Anything that doesn't naturally fit in a password manager…
…like the password to your password manager.
The trap
Cyclic dependencies lock people out .
Her phone
Apple password
Password manager
2FA app
needs
lives in
needs
was on the phone
Exactly the moment you reach for a break-glass recovery tool.
The unanswerable question
Where do you keep the password to your password manager ?
Choices that matter on paper
The boring details decide if it works.
Printed on archive-grade paper , stored in tamper-evident envelopes.
Under the hood
It comes down to four functions .
src/services/EncryptionService.js
import { split, combine } from 'shamir-secret-sharing' ;
export class EncryptionService {
// 1. AES-256-GCM encrypt (Web Crypto API)
static encrypt (secret, password) { … }
// 2. split the key into m-of-n shares
static splitKey (key, shares, threshold) {
return split (key, shares, threshold);
}
// 3. combine a threshold of shares back into the key
static combineShares (shares) {
return combine (shares);
}
// 4. decrypt with the recovered key
static decrypt (data, key, iv) { … }
}
Native Web Crypto API for encryption, Privy's audited shamir-secret-sharing for key splitting.
Don't trust, verify
Is the encryption really done in my browser?
Yes. AES-256-GCM via the Web Crypto API, fully client-side. No network calls.
What if I lose two of my five shares?
3-of-5 means you can lose two and still recover. Lose three and it's gone, by design.
Audit it by talking to it .
Open source: every line on GitHub, MIT-licensed
Chat with the codebase in plain language
Let AI help you reason about your own threat model
Going pro
The same gear institutions use.
Archive-grade paper Acid-free, built to last decades Source: archivalsurvival.com.au
Tamper-evident envelopes A guardian can tell if a share was opened Source: SECUR-PAK
Live demo
Let's create a vault, and unlock it .
papervault.xyz · works with the wifi off
In one line
A root of trust that's yours : offline, distributed, on paper.
Encrypt · AES-256
Split · Shamir m-of-n
Print · survives decades
Open source works offline designed for resilience
Thank you, and special thanks to the Privy team for the Shamir library. Questions?